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Abstract
Each individual handles many tasks of finding the most profitable op-
tion from a set of options that stochastically provide rewards. Our society
comprises a collection of such individuals, and the society is expected to
maximise the total rewards, while the individuals compete for common re-
wards. Such collective decision making is formulated as the ‘competitive
multi-armed bandit problem (CBP)’, requiring a huge computational cost.
Herein, we demonstrate a prototype of an analog computer that efficiently
solves CBPs by exploiting the physical dynamics of numerous fluids in cou-
pled cylinders. This device enables the maximisation of the total rewards for
the society without paying the conventionally required computational cost;
this is because the fluids estimate the reward probabilities of the options for
the exploitation of past knowledge and generate random fluctuations for the
exploration of new knowledge. Our results suggest that to optimise the social
rewards, the utilisation of fluid-derived natural fluctuations is more advanta-
geous than applying artificial external fluctuations. Our analog computing
scheme is expected to trigger further studies for harnessing the huge compu-
tational power of natural phenomena for resolving a wide variety of complex
problems in modern information society.
Introduction
The benefits to an organization (the whole) and those to its constituent members
(parts) sometimes conflict. For example, let us consider a situation wherein traf-
fic congestion is caused by a driver making a selfish decision to pursue his/her
individual benefit to quickly arrive at a destination. In a situation wherein a car
bound from south to north approaches an intersection where preceding vehicles
are stalled while the signal is about to turn in red, the driver must refrain from
selfishly deciding to enter the intersection. Otherwise, the car would obstruct other
vehicles’ paths in the west and east directions, stalled in the intersection after the
signal turned red. Thus, the whole’s benefit can be spoiled by that of a part.
The conflict between the whole’s benefit and that of the parts frequently arises
in a wide variety of situations in modern society. Confrontations between commu-
nities and wars between nations can be seen as caused by collisions of global and
local interests. In realistic political judgment, many of these collisions are mod-
elled using a game-theoretic approach by appropriately setting up a payoff matrix
[1]. In mobile communication, the channel assignment problem in cognitive ra-
dio communication can also be represented as a particular class of payoff matrix.
Herein, we consider the competitive bandit problem (CBP), which a problem of
maximising total rewards through collective decision making and requires a huge
computational cost for an increase in problem size. We demonstrate a method for
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exploiting the computational power of the physical dynamics of numerous fluids
in coupled cylinders to efficiently solve the problem.
Consider two slot machines. Both machines have individual reward probabili-
ties PA and PB. At each trial, a player selects one of the machines and obtains some
reward, a coin for example, with the corresponding probability. The player wants
to maximise the total reward sum obtained after a particular number of selections.
However, it is assumed that the player does not know these probabilities. How can
the player gain maximal rewards? The multi-armed bandit problem (BP) involves
determining the optimal strategy for selecting the machine which yields maximum
rewards by referring to past experiences.
Figure 1: Competitive Bandit Problem (CBP). (a) segregation state. (b) collision
state. (c) Payoff matrix for player 1 (player 2).
For simplicity, we consider here the minimum CBP, i.e. two players (1 and
2) and two machines (A and B), as shown in Fig. 1. It is supposed that a player
playing a machine can obtain some reward, a coin for example, with the probability
Pi. Figure 1(c) shows the payoff matrix for players 1 and 2.
If a collision occurs, i.e. two players select the same machine, the reward is
evenly split between those players. We seek an algorithm that can obtain the max-
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imum total rewards (scores) of all players. To acquire the maximum total rewards,
the algorithm must contain a mechanism that can avoid the ‘Nash equilibrium’
states, which are the natural consequence for a group of independent selfish play-
ers, and can determine the ‘social maximum [2]’ states which can obtain maximum
total rewards. In our previous studies [7, 8, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16], we showed that our pro-
posed algorithm called ‘Tug-Of-War (TOW) dynamics’ is more efficient than other
well-known algorithms such as the modified -greedy and softmax algorithms, and
is comparable to the ‘upper confidence bound1-tuned (UCB1T) algorithm’, which
is known as the best among parameter-free algorithms [6]. Moreover, TOW dy-
namics effectively adapts to a changing environment wherein the reward probabil-
ities dynamically switch. Algorithms for solving CBP are applicable to various
fields such as Monte Carlo tree search, which is used in algorithms for the ‘game
of GO’ [11, 12], cognitive radio [13, 14], and web advertising [15].
Herein, by applying TOW dynamics that exploit the volume conservation law,
we propose a physical device that efficiently computes the optimal machine assign-
ments of all players in a centralised control. The proposed device consists of two
kinds of fluids in cylinders: one representing ‘decision making by a player’ and
the other representing the ‘interaction between players (collision avoider)’. We
call the physical device the ‘TOW bombe’ owing to its similarity to the ‘Turing
bombe’ invented by Alan Turing, the analog electric circuit used by the British
army for decoding the German army’s ‘enigma code’ of the during World War II
[16]. The assignment problem for M players and N machines can be automati-
cally solved simply by repeatedly operating (up-and-down operation of the fluid
interface in a cylinder) M times at every iteration in the TOW bombe without cal-
culating the evaluation values of O(NM). This suggests that an analog computer is
more advantageous than a digital computer, if we appropriately use the natural phe-
nomena. Although the problems considered here are not really nondeterministic-
polynomial-time (NP) problems, we can show advantages of natural fluctuations
generated in the device and suggest a possibility to extend the device to apply to
NP problems. Using the TOW bombe, we can automatically achieve the social
maximum assignments by entrusting the huge amount of computations for evalua-
tion values to the physical processes of fluids.
Consider an incompressible fluid in a cylinder, as shown in Fig. 2(a). Here,
Xk corresponds to the displacement of terminal k from an initial position, where
k ∈ {A, B}. If Xk is greater than 0, we consider that the liquid selects machine k.
We used the following estimate Qk (k ∈ {A, B}):
Qk(t) = Nk(t) − (1 + ω)Lk(t). (1)
Here, Nk is the number of playing machine k until time t and Lk is the number of
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Figure 2: (a) TOW dynamics. (b) The TOW bombe for three players and five
channels.
non-rewarded (i.e. failed) events in k until time t, where ω is a weighting parameter
(see Method).
The displacement XA (= −XB) is determined by the following difference equa-
tion:
XA(t) = QA(t) − QB(t) + δ. (2)
Here, δ(t) is an arbitrary fluctuation to which the liquid is subjected. Consequently
the TOW dynamics evolve according to a particularly simple rule: in addition to
the fluctuation, if machine k is played at each time t, +1 and −ω are added to Xk(t−
1) when rewarded and non-rewarded, respectively (Fig. 2(a)). The authors have
shown that this simple dynamics gains more rewards (coins or packet transmissions
in cognitive radio) than those obtained by other popular algorithms for solving the
BP [7, 8, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16].
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Many algorithms for the BP estimate the reward probability of each machine.
In most cases, this ‘estimate’ is updated only when the corresponding machine
is selected. In contrast, TOW dynamics uses a unique learning method which is
equivalent to that updating both estimates simultaneously owing to the volume
conservation law [5, 6]. TOW dynamics can imitate the system that determines its
next moves at time t + 1 in referring to the estimate of each machine, even if it was
not selected at time t, as if the two machines were simultaneously selected at time t.
This unique feature is one of the sources of the TOW’s high performance [16]. We
call this the ‘TOW principle’. This principle is also applicable to a more general
BP (see Method).
1 Results
The TOW bombe for three players (1, 2 and 3) and five machines (A, B,C,D and E)
is illustrated in Figure 2(b). Two kinds of incompressible fluids (blue and yellow)
fill coupled cylinders. The blue (bottom) fluid handles a player’s decisions made,
while the yellow (upper) one handles interaction among players. Machine selection
of each player at each iteration is determined by the height of a red adjuster (a fluid
interface level), and the highest machine is chosen. When the movements of blue
and yellow adjusters stabilise to reach equilibrium, the TOW principle in the blue
fluid holds for each player. In other words, when one interface rises, the other
four interfaces fall, resulting in efficient machine selections. Simultaneously, the
action-reaction law holds for the yellow fluid (i.e. if the interface level of player 1
rises, the interface levels of players 2 and 3 fall), contributing collision avoidance,
and the TOW bombe can search for an overall optimisation solution accurately
and quickly. In normal use, however, blue and yellow adjusters must have fixed
positions not to move.
The dynamics of the TOW bombe are expressed as follows:
Q(i,k)(t) = ∆Q(i,k)(t) + Q(i,k)(t − 1)
− 1
M − 1
∑
j,i
∆Q( j,k)(t), (3)
X(i,k)(t) = Q(i,k)(t) − 1N − 1
∑
l,k
Q(i,l)(t). (4)
Here, X(i,k)(t) is the height of the interface of player i and machine k at iteration
step t. If machine k is chosen for player i at time t, ∆Q(i,k)(t) is +1 or −ω according
to the result (rewarded or not). Otherwise, it is 0.
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In addition to the above-mentioned dynamics, some fluctuations or external
oscillations are added to X(i,k). These added fluctuations or oscillations are sensi-
tive to the TOW bombe’s performance, because fluctuations represent exploration
patterns in the early stage.
Thus, the TOW bombe operates only by adding an operation which raises or
lowers the interface level (+1 or −ω) according to the result (success or failure of
coin gain) for each player (total M times) at each time. After these operations,
the interface levels move according to the volume conservation law, calculating
the next selection for each player. In each player’s selection, an efficient search is
achieved as a result of the TOW principle, which can obtain a solution accurately
and quickly for trial-and-error tasks. Moreover, through the interaction among
players via yellow fluid, the Nash equilibrium can be avoided, thereby achieving
the social maximum [2].
To show that the TOW bombe avoids the Nash equilibrium and regularly achieves
an overall optimisation, we consider a case wherein (PA, PB, PC , PD, PE) = (0.03,
0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.9) as a typical example. For simplicity, part of the payoff tensor
that has 125 (=53) elements is described as follows; only matrix elements for which
each player does not choose low-ranking A and B are shown (Table 5, 6 and 7). For
each matrix element, the reward probabilities are given in the order of players 1, 2
and 3.
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the case where (PC , PD, PE)=(0.1, 0.2, 0.9), player 3
chooses C
player 2: C player 2: D player 2: E
player 1: C 1/30, 1/30, 1/30 0.05, 0.2, 0.05 0.05, 0.9, 0.05
player 1: D 0.2, 0.05, 0.05 0.1, 0.1, 0.1 0.2, 0.9, 0.1 SM
player 1: E 0.9, 0.05, 0.05 0.9, 0.2, 0.1 SM 0.45, 0.45, 0.1
Table 2: Payoff matrix of the case where (PC , PD, PE)=(0.1, 0.2, 0.9), player 3
chooses D
player 2: C player 2: D player 2: E
player 1: C 0.05, 0.05, 0.2 0.1, 0.1, 0.1 0.1, 0.9, 0.2 SM
player 1: D 0.1, 0.1, 0.1 2/30, 2/30, 2/30 0.1, 0.9, 0.1
player 1: E 0.9, 0.1, 0.2 SM 0.9, 0.1, 0.1 0.45, 0.45, 0.2
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Table 3: Payoff matrix of the case where (PC , PD, PE)=(0.1, 0.2, 0.9), player 3
chooses E
player 2: C player 2: D player 2: E
player 1: C 0.05, 0.05, 0.9 0.1, 0.2, 0.9 SM 0.1, 0.45, 0.45
player 1: D 0.2, 0.1, 0.9 SM 0.1, 0.1, 0.9 0.2, 0.45, 0.45
player 1: E 0.45, 0.1, 0.45 0.45, 0.2, 0.45 0.3, 0.3, 0.3 NE
Social maximum (SM) is a state in which the maximum amount of total reward
is obtained by all the players. In this problem, the social maximum corresponds
to a segregation state in which the players choose the top three distinct machines
(C,D, E), respectively; there are six segregation states indicated by SM in the Ta-
bles. In contrast, the Nash equilibrium (NE) is a state in which all the players
choose machine E independent of others’ decisions; machine E gives the reward
with the highest probability, when each player behaves selfishly.
The performance of the TOW bombe was evaluated using a score: the num-
ber of rewards (coins) a player obtained in his/her 1, 000 plays. In cognitive radio
communication, the score corresponds to the number of packets that have success-
fully transmitted [13, 14]. Figure 3(a) shows the TOW bombe scores in the typical
example wherein (PA, PB, PC , PD, PE) = (0.03, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.9). Since 1, 000
samples were used, there are 1, 000 circles. Each circle indicates the score obtained
by player i (horizontal axis) and player j (vertical axis) for one sample. There are
six clusters in Figure 3(a) corresponding to the two-dimensional projections of the
six segregation states, implying the overall optimisation. The social maximum
points are given as follows: (the score of player 1, the score of player 2, the score
of player 3) = (100, 200, 900), (100, 900, 200), (200, 100, 900), (200, 900, 100),
(900, 100, 200) and (900, 200, 100). The TOW bombe did not reach the Nash
equilibrium state (300, 300, 300).
In our simulations, we used ‘adaptive’ weighting parameter ω, meaning that
the parameter is estimated by using its own variables (see Method). Owing to this
estimation cost, clusters of circles are not located exactly at the social maximum
points. If we set weighting parameter ω at 0.08, which are calculated as γ′=PB+PC
(see Method), those clusters are located exactly on the social maximum points (see
Figures in [17]).
Figure 3(b) shows TOW bombe performance, sample averages of the total
scores of all players up to 1, 000 plays, for three different type of fluctuation,
respectively. The black, red and blue lines denote the cases of internal random
fluctuations, internal fixed fluctuations and external oscillations, respectively (see
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Figure 3: (a) TOW bombe scores in the case wherein (PA, PB, PC , PD, PE) = (0.03,
0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.9). (b) Sample averages of total TOW bombe scores in the case
wherein (PA, PB, PC , PD, PE) = (0.03, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.9). (c) Sample averages of
mean distance between players’ scores in the case wherein (PA, PB, PC , PD, PE) =
(0.03, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.9).
Method). The horizontal axis denotes the sample averages of maximum fluc-
tuation. In the maximal case, the average total score has gained nearly 1, 200
(=100+200+900), which is the value of the social maximum, although there are
some gaps resulting from estimation costs.
Figure 3(c) also shows TOW bombe fairness, sample averages of the mean
distance between players’ scores, for three different types of fluctuation, respec-
tively. We can confirm lower fairness in the cases of internal fixed fluctuations
(red line). Artificially created fluctuations, such as internal fixed fluctuations, of-
ten show lower fairness because of the existence of biases (lack of uniformity or
randomness) in fluctuations. Although the external oscillations (sine waves) have
higher fairness (blue line), controlling the blue and yellow adjusters appropriately
is difficult. Moreover, the performances of these two types of fluctuation rapidly
decrease as the magnitude of fluctuations increases, as shown in Fig. 3(b).
We can conclude that only the internal random fluctuations, which are supposed
to be generated automatically in the real TOW bombe, exhibit higher performance
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and fairness. This conclusion is consistent even in cases where we set weighting
parameter ω at 0.08. This indicates the construction of a novel analog computing
scheme which exploits nature’s power in terms of automatic generation of random
fluctuations, simultaneous computations using a conservation law and intrinsic ef-
ficiency.
2 Discussion
How can we harness nature’s power for computations such as automatic generation
of random fluctuations, simultaneous computations using a conservation law and
intrinsic efficiency as well as the feasibility of massive computations?
Alan Turing mathematically clarified a concept of ‘computation’ by proposing
his Turing machine, the most simple model of computation [18, 19]. A Turing
machine consists of a sequence of steps which can read and write a single symbol
on tape. These ‘discrete’ and ‘sequential’ steps are ‘simple’ for a human to under-
stand. Moreover, he found a ‘universal Turing machine’ that can simulate all other
computations. Owing to this machine, algorithms can be studied on their own,
without regard to the systems that are implementing them [20]. Human beings no
longer need to be concerned about underlying mechanisms. In other words, soft-
ware can be abstracted away from hardware. This property has brought substantial
development in digital computers. Simultaneously, however, these algorithms have
lost links to natural phenomena implementing them. He had exchanged natural
affinity for artificial convenience.
Digital computers created a ‘monster’ called ‘exponential explosion’, wherein
computational cost grows exponentially as a function of problem size (NP prob-
lems). In our daily lives, we often encounter this type of problem, such as schedul-
ing, satisfiability (SAT) and resource allocation problems. For a digital computer,
such problems become intractable as the problem size grows. In contrast, nature
always ‘computes’ infinitely many computations at every moment [21]. However,
we do not know how to extract and harness this power of nature.
Herein, we demonstrate that an analog decision-making device, called the TOW
bombe, can be implemented physically by using two kinds of incompressible fluid
in coupled cylinders and can efficiently achieve overall optimisation in the machine
assignment problem in CBP by exploiting nature’s power, including automatic gen-
eration of random fluctuations, simultaneous computations using a conservation
law and intrinsic efficiency. The randomness of fluctuations generated automati-
cally in the real TOW bombe might not be high, but there are ways to enhance
randomness. For example, turbulence occurs if we move an adjuster rapidly in an
up-and-down operation.
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The TOW bombe enables us to solve the assignment problem for M players
and N machines by repeating M up-and-down operations of fluid interface levels
in cylinders at each iteration; it does not require calculation for as many evalua-
tion values as are required when using a conventional digital computer, because it
entrusts the huge amount of computation to the physical processes of fluids. This
suggests that there are advantages to analog computation even in today’s digital
age.
Although the payoff tensor has NM elements, the TOW bombe need not hold
NM evaluation values. If we ignore the diagonal elements, N evaluation values are
sufficient for each player’s estimation of which machine is the best. Therefore, us-
ing the TOW bombe, the CBP is reducible to an O(NM) problem when implement-
ing a collision-avoiding mechanism handled by yellow fluid, although, in a strict
sense, the computational cost must include the cost for providing random fluctu-
ations generated by the fluids’ physical dynamics. In Fig. 3(b), we showed the
results of only three types of fluctuation. TOW bombe performance with internal
M-random fluctuations (see Method) was the same as that of the internal random
fluctuations, although computations for generating the former type of fluctuation
require a cost that exponentially grows as O(NM). This is because the exponential
type of fluctuation is not effective for O(NM) problems. Various random seed pat-
terns do not affect enhancing the performance of O(NM) problems because of the
reducibility of CBP to three independent BPs.
However, this is not the cases if we focus on more complex problems, such
as the ‘Extended Prisoner’s Dilemma Game’ (see Supplementary Information); we
must prepare more than NM evaluation values, because a player’s reward is dras-
tically changed according to the selections of other players in this problem. There
are some cases that can be approximately solved by the TOW bombe even in this
type of complex problem. In these cases, the exponential type of fluctuation can en-
hance the performance slightly. This fact may suggest that we find the first toehold
to harnessing nature’s power which is the feasibility of massive computations.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to solve this type of complex problem using the
TOW bombe in general. To solve more complex problems, we must also extend the
TOW bombe. We have some ideas regarding TOW bombe extension using some
fluid compressibility, local inflow and outflow, a reservoir for blue or yellow fluid,
a time order of fluctuations and quantum effects such as non-locality and entangle-
ment. The TOW bombe can also be implemented on the basis of quantum physics.
In fact, the authors have exploited optical energy transfer dynamics between quan-
tum dots and single photons to design decision-making devices [22, 23, 24]. Our
method might be applicable to a class of problems derived from CBP and broader
varieties of game payoff tensors, implying that wider applications can be expected.
We will report these observations and results elsewhere in the future.
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Methods
The weighting parameter ω
TOW dynamics involves the parameter ω which is sensitive to its performance.
From analytical calculations, it is known that the following ω0 is sub-optimal in
the BP (see Supplementary Information or [16]),
ω0 =
γ
2 − γ , (5)
γ = PA + PB. (6)
Here, it is assumed that PA is the largest reward probability and PB is the second
largest.
In the CBP cases (M-player and N-machine), the following ω0 is sub-optimal,
ω0 =
γ′
2 − γ′ , (7)
γ′ = P(M) + P(M+1) (8)
Here, P(M) is the top Mth reward probability.
Players must estimate ω0 using its variables, because information regarding
reward probabilities is not given to players. We call this an ‘adaptive’ weighting
parameter. There are many estimate methods, such as Bayesian inference, but we
simply use ‘direct substitution’ herein. Direct substitution uses R j(t)/N j(t) for P j,
where R j(t) is the number of reward gains from machine j through time t and N j(t)
is the number of plays of machine j through time t.
TOW dynamics for general BP
In this paper, we use TOW dynamics only for the Bernoulli type of BP in which
the reward r is 1 or 0. Another type of TOW dynamics can also be constructed for
general BP in which the reward r is a real value from an interval [0,R]. Here, R is
arbitrary positive value, and the reward r is selected according to given probability
distribution whose mean and variance are µ and σ2, respectively.
In this case, the following estimate Qk (k ∈ {A, B}) is used insted of eq.(1):
Qk(t) = Σtj=1rk( j) − γ∗Nk(t). (9)
Here, Nk is the number of playing machine k until time t and rk( j) is the reward in
k at time j, where γ∗ is the following parameter:
γ∗ =
µA + µB
2
. (10)
If machine k is played at each time t, the reward rk(t) and −γ∗ are added to Xk(t−1).
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Generating methods of fluctuation
1. Internal fixed fluctuations
First, we define fixed moves Ok′ (k′ = 0, · · · , 4), as follows,
{O0,O1,O2,O3,O4} = {0, A, 0,−A, 0} (11)
Here, A is an amplitude parameter. Note that
∑4
k′=0 Ok′ = 0.
To use the above move Ok recursively, we introduce a new variable num (num =
0, · · · , 4), as follows,
num = {t + (k − 2)} mod 5 (12)
Here, t is a time. For each machine k (k = 1, · · · , 5), we use the following set of
fluctuations, respectively,
osc(1,k)(t) = O0, (13)
osc(2,k)(t) = O3, (14)
osc(3,k)(t) = O1. (15)
If num = 0.
osc(1,k)(t) = O1, (16)
osc(2,k)(t) = O4, (17)
osc(3,k)(t) = O3. (18)
If num = 1.
osc(1,k)(t) = O2, (19)
osc(2,k)(t) = O0, (20)
osc(3,k)(t) = O4. (21)
If num = 2.
osc(1,k)(t) = O3, (22)
osc(2,k)(t) = O1, (23)
osc(3,k)(t) = O2. (24)
If num = 3.
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osc(1,k)(t) = O4, (25)
osc(2,k)(t) = O2, (26)
osc(3,k)(t) = O0. (27)
If num = 4.
It always holds that
∑3
i=1 osc(i,k)(t) = 0 and
∑5
k=1 osc(i,k)(t) = 0. These con-
ditions mean that added fluctuations to X(i,k) can be cancelled in total. In other
words, the total volume of blue or yellow fluid does not change. As a result, we
create artificial ‘internal’ fluctuations.
2. Internal random fluctuations
First, a matrix sheet of random fluctuations (S heet(i,k)) is prepared. Here, i =
1, · · · , 3 and k = 1, · · · , 5.
1. r is a random value from [0, 1]. We call this ‘seed’.
2. There are NM (= 15) possibilities for a seed position. Choose the seed
position (i0, k0) randomly from i0 = 1, · · · , 3 and k0 = 1, · · · , 5 and place the
seed r at the point,
S heet(i0,k0) = r. (28)
3. All elements of the k0th column other than (io, k0) are substituted with −0.5∗
r.
4. All elements of the i0-th row other than (io, k0) are substituted with −0.25∗r.
5. All remaining elements are substituted with r/8.0.
6. The matrix sheet is accumulated in a summation matrix S um(i,k).
7. Repeat from two to six for D times. Here, D is a parameter.
We used the following set of fluctuations,
osc(i,k)(t) = A/D ∗ S um(i,k). (29)
Here, A is an amplitude parameter.
It always holds that
∑3
i=1 osc(i,k)(t) = 0 and
∑5
k=1 osc(i,k)(t) = 0, as well as
the internal fixed fluctuations. The total volume of blue or yellow fluid does not
change. As a result, we create ‘internal’ random fluctuations naturally. At every
time step, this procedure costs O(N · M) computations with a digital computer.
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3. Internal M-random fluctuations (exponential)
First, a matrix sheet of random fluctuations (S heet(i,k)) is prepared. Here, i =
1, · · · , 3 and k = 1, · · · , 5.
1. For each player i, independent random value ri is generated from [0, 1]. We
call these ‘seeds’.
2. There are NM (= 125) possibilities for a seed position pattern. For each
player i, choose the seed position (i, k0(i)) randomly from k0(i) = 1, · · · , 5
and place the seed ri at the point,
S heet(i,k0(i)) = ri. (30)
However, we choose k0(i)s to be distinct. Therefore, there are really N(N −
1)(N − 2) (= 60) possibilities.
3. For each i, all elements of the k0(i)-th column other than (i, k0(i)) are substi-
tuted with −0.5 ∗ ri.
4. All remaining elements of the 1th row are substituted with −0.50∗(r1−0.50∗
r2 − 0.50 ∗ r3).
5. All remaining elements of the 2 th row are substituted with −0.50 ∗ (r2 −
0.50 ∗ r1 − 0.50 ∗ r3).
6. All remaining elements of the 3 th row are substituted with −0.50 ∗ (r3 −
0.50 ∗ r1 − 0.50 ∗ r2).
7. The matrix sheet is accumulated in a summation matrix S um(i,k).
8. Repeat from two to seven for D times. Here, D is a parameter.
We used the following set of fluctuations,
osc(i,k) = A/D ∗ S um(i,k). (31)
Here, A is an amplitude parameter.
It always holds that
∑3
i=1 osc(i,k)(t) = 0 and
∑5
k=1 osc(i,k)(t) = 0 as well as the
internal fixed or random fluctuations. The total volume of blue or yellow fluid does
not change. As a result, we create ‘internal’ M-random fluctuations naturally. At
every time step, this procedure costs exponential computations of O(NM) with a
digital computer.
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4. External oscillations
Herein, we used completely synchronised oscillations osc(i,k)(t) added to every
player’s X(i,k),
osc(i,k)(t) = A sin(2pit/5 + 2pi(k − 1)/5). (32)
Here, i = 1, · · ·, 3 and k = 1, · · ·, 5. A is an amplitude parameter. These oscillations
are externally provided by appropriately controlling the blue and yellow adjusters.
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Supplementary Information
Efficient Decision-Making by Physical Objects
Elements of computing devices are subject to physical laws that work as ‘con-
straints’. These constraints always have negative effects on computing ability. For
example, in a complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) structure, con-
siderably complicated circuits are required even for simple logical operations such
as NAND and NOR because physical constraints can violate logically correct be-
haviour in simple structures.
However, herein, we show the opposite fact that such constraints can also have
positive effects. That is, computational efficiency can be generated from the move-
ments of physical objects which are subjected to the volume conservation law. This
‘tug-of-war (TOW) principle’ is addressed as efficiency in ‘trial-and-error’.
Consider two slot machines. Both machines have individual reward probabil-
ities PA and PB. At each trial, a player selects one of the machines and obtains
some reward, a coin for example, with the corresponding probability. The player
wants to maximize the total reward sum obtained after a particular number of se-
lections. However, it is supposed that the player does not know these probabilities.
The multi-armed bandit problem (BP) involves determining the optimal strategy
for selecting the machine which yields maximum rewards by referring to past ex-
periences.
The BP was originally described by Robbins [1], although the essential prob-
lem was studied earlier by Thompson [2]. The optimal strategy is known only
for a limited class of problems wherein the reward distributions are assumed to be
‘known’ to the players [3, 4]. Even in these problems, computing the Gittins index
in practice is not tractable for many problems. Agrawal and Auer et al. proposed
decision-making algorithms that could express the index as a simple function of
the total reward obtained from a machine [5, 6]. Especially, the ‘upper confidence
bound 1 (UCB1) algorithm’ proposed by Auer is used worldwide for many appli-
cations.
Kim et al. proposed a ‘decision-making dynamics’ called TOW; it was in-
spired by the true slime mold Physarum [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], which maintains a
constant intracellular resource volume while collecting environmental information
by concurrently expanding and shrinking its branches. The conservation law en-
tails a ‘non-local correlation’ among the branches, that is, the volume increment in
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one branch is immediately compensated for by volume decrement(s) in the other
branch(es). This non-local correlation was shown to be useful for decision making.
In this paper, we propose ‘the TOW principle’, which explains why computa-
tional efficiency can be generated from the movements of physical objects that are
subjected to the volume conservation law.
Solvability: random walk approach
Let us consider a one-dimensional random walk, where the distance of right flight
when ‘a coin’ is dispensed is α and the distance of left flight when ‘no coin’ is
dispensed is β. We assume that PA (probability of right flight in random walk A) >
PB (probability of right flight in random walk B) for simplicity. After time step t,
the displacement Rk(t) (k ∈ {A, B}) can be described by
Rk(t) = α(Nk − Lk) − β Lk
= αNk − (α + β) Lk. (33)
Here, Nk is the number of playing machine k until time t and Lk is the number of
non-rewarded (i.e. left flight) events in k until time t. The expected value of Rk can
be obtain from the following equation,
E(Rk(t)) = {αPA − β(1 − PB)} Nk. (34)
In the overlapping area between two distributions of RA and RB, we cannot
estimate correctly which is the greater. The overlapping area must decrease as Nk
increases to avoid incorrect judgements. This requirement can be expressed in the
following forms:
αPA − β(1 − PB) > 0, (35)
αPB − β(1 − PA) < 0. (36)
These forms can be transformed to the form
PB <
β
α + β
< PA. (37)
In other words, the parameter α and β must satisfy the above conditions for the
random walk to represent correctly the larger judgement. We can easily confirm
that the following form satisfies these conditions
β
α + β
=
PA + PB
2
. (38)
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On the other hand, we use the following learning rule in our TOW dynamics,
Qk(t) = Nk(t) − (1 + ω)Lk(t). (39)
Here, ω is a weighting parameter. From Rk(t)/α = Qk(t), we obtain
ω =
β
α
. (40)
From Eq.(38) and (40), we can obtain
ω =
γ
2 − γ , (41)
γ = PA + PB. (42)
Therefore, we can conclude that the algorithm using the learning rule Qk with the
parameterω can accurately solve the BP. Here, we useω0 for the aboveω. Detailed
analytical calculations are presented in [16].
The TOW principle
In many popular algorithms, such as the -greedy algorithm, an estimate for reward
probability is updated only in a selected arm. In contrast, we consider the case
wherein the sum of the reward probabilities γ = PA + PB is given. Then, we can
update both estimates simultaneously as follows,
A:
NA−LA
NA
B: γ − NA−LANA ,
A: γ − NB−LBNB B:
NB−LB
NB
.
Here, the top and bottom rows give estimates based on the information that ma-
chines A and B were selected NA and NB times, respectively. Note that we can also
update the estimate of the machine that was not played, owing to information γ.
From the above estimates, each expected reward Q′k (k ∈ {A, B}) is given as
follows,
Q′A = NA
NA − LA
NA
+ NB
(
γ − NB − LB
NB
)
= NA − LA + (γ − 1) NB + LB, (43)
Q′B = NA
(
γ − NA − LA
NA
)
+ NB
NB − LB
NB
= NB − LB + (γ − 1) NA + LA. (44)
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These expected rewards Q′js are not the same as the TOW dynamics learning rules,
Q js (Eq.(39)). However, what we use substantially in the TOW is the difference,
QA − QB = (NA − NB) − (1 + ω) (LA − LB). (45)
When we transform the expected rewards Q′js into
Q′′A = Q
′
A/(2 − γ), (46)
Q′′B = Q
′
B/(2 − γ), (47)
we can obtain the difference,
Q′′A − Q′′B = (NA − NB) −
2
2 − γ (LA − LB). (48)
Comparing the coefficient of Eqs.(45) and (48), those two differences are always
equal when ω = ω0 satisfies,
ω0 =
γ
2 − γ . (49)
Eventually, we can obtain the nearly optimal weight parameter ω0 in terms of γ.
This derivation means that TOW dynamics has a learning rule equivalent to
that of the system that can simultaneously update both estimates. TOW can imitate
the system that determines its next moves at time t+1 in referring to the estimate of
each arm even if it was not selected at time t, as if the two arms were simultaneously
selected at time t. This unique feature in the learning rule, derived from the fact
that the sum of reward probabilities is given in advance, is one of the sources of
TOW’s high performance.
Performing Monte Carlo simulations, it was confirmed that the performance of
TOW dynamics with ω0 is comparable to its best performance, i.e. the TOW with
ωopt. To derive the ωopt accurately, we need to consider the fluctuations [10].
The essence described here can be extended to general K machines cases. If
you want to separate distributions of the top mth and (m + 1)th machine in the
previous subsection, all you need do is use the following parameter ω0.
ω0 =
γ′
2 − γ′ , (50)
γ′ = P(m) + P(m+1) (51)
Here, P(m) denotes the top mth reward probability.
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Discussion
Performances of algorithms that can solve the BP are mostly evaluated using the
‘regret’ defined as follows, which quantifies the accumulated losses of rewards,
regret = (PA − PB)E(NB). (52)
Here, E(NB) denotes the expected value of NB.
It is known that optimal algorithms for the BP, defined by Auer et al., have a
regret proportional to log(N) [6]. The regret has no finite upper bound as N in-
creases because it continues to require playing the lower-reward machine to ensure
that the probability of incorrect judgment goes to zero. Interestingly, we analyt-
ically demonstrated in our previous work that our TOW dynamics has a constant
regret [16]. A constant regret means that the probability of incorrect judgment
remains non-zero in TOW dynamics, though this probability is nearly equal to
zero. However, it would appear that the reward probabilities change frequently in
actual decision-making situations and their long-term behaviour is not crucial for
many practical purposes. For this reason, TOW dynamics would be more suited to
real-world applications.
Herein, we propose ‘the TOW principle’ which explains why computational
efficiency can be generated from the movements of physical objects due to the vol-
ume conservation law. In ordinal decision-making algorithms, the parameter of
‘exploration time’ is optimized for the BP. That parameter ordinarily represents |
PA − PB | (or inverse of it). As a result, we proposed another independent opti-
mization wherein the parameter represents information of PA+PB herein. Owing
to this novel approach to the BP, computational efficiency can be obtained by di-
rectly using physical objects. This idea of the physical implementation of TOW is
applicable to various fields including constructing completely new analog comput-
ers [17].
Extended Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Consider a situation wherein three people are arrested by police and are required
to choose from the following five options:
• A: keep silent,
• B: confess (implicate him- or herself)
• C: implicate the next person (circulative as 1,2,3,1,2,3,· · ·),
• D: implicate the third person (circulative as 1,2,3,1,2,3,· · ·),
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• E: implicate both of the others.
According to the three person’s choices, the ‘degree of charges’ (from 0 to 3) are to
be determined for every person. For example, the degree of charges are (1, 1, 1) for
the choice (person 1, person 2, person3) = (B,B,B), (1, 1, 0) for the choice (A,B,C),
(2, 1, 1) for the choice (B,C,D), (2, 2, 1) for the choice (C,D,D), (2, 2, 2) for the
choice (D,D,D), (3, 1, 1) for the choice (B,D,D) etc. For each pattern of degree of
charges, a set of reward probabilities of each person are determined as follows:
• the (0, 0, 0) is (R2,R2,R2),
• the (1, 1, 1) is (R1,R1,R1),
• the (2, 1, 1) or (1, 2, 1) or (1, 1, 2) is (R,R,R): the social maximum,
• the (2, 2, 2) is (P,P,P): the Nash eqilibrium.
Otherwise, each difference between his or her degree and the minimum degree
of the pattern determines a reward probability. If his/her degree is the same as
the minimum degree, the reward probability is ‘T’, otherwise ‘S’. Moreover, the
difference between his or her degree and the minimum degree of the pattern is
added to it. For example, the (1, 1, 0) is (S 1,S 1,T1), the (2, 2, 1) is (S 1,S 1,T1), the
(3, 1, 1) is (S 2,T2,T2). Here, we set T3 = 0.79, T2 = 0.76, T1 = 0.73, R = 0.70,
R1 = 0.60, R2 = 0.55, P = 0.50, S 1 = 0.40, S 2 = 0.30 and S 3 = 0.20. Therefore,
the social maximum is (R,R,R). Here, it is assumed that police knows that there are
a main suspect and two accomplices. The complete list of reward probabilities is
shown in Table 4, 5, 6 and 7.
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Table 4: Reward probabilities in the Extended Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
selection pattern degree of charges probability
( A, A, A ) ( 0, 0, 0 ) 0.55 0.55 0.55
( A, A, B ) ( 0, 0, 1 ) 0.73 0.73 0.40
( A, A, C ) ( 1, 0, 0 ) 0.40 0.73 0.73
( A, A, D ) ( 0, 1, 0 ) 0.73 0.40 0.73
( A, A, E ) ( 1, 1, 0 ) 0.40 0.40 0.73
( A, B, A ) ( 0, 1, 0 ) 0.73 0.40 0.73
( A, B, B ) ( 0, 1, 1 ) 0.73 0.40 0.40
( A, B, C ) ( 1, 1, 0 ) 0.40 0.40 0.73
( A, B, D ) ( 0, 2, 0 ) 0.76 0.30 0.76
( A, B, E ) ( 1, 2, 0 ) 0.73 0.30 0.76
( A, C, A ) ( 0, 0, 1 ) 0.73 0.73 0.40
( A, C, B ) ( 0, 0, 2 ) 0.76 0.76 0.30
( A, C, C ) ( 1, 0, 1 ) 0.40 0.73 0.40
( A, C, D ) ( 0, 1, 1 ) 0.73 0.40 0.40
( A, C, E ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( A, D, A ) ( 1, 0, 0 ) 0.40 0.73 0.73
( A, D, B ) ( 1, 0, 1 ) 0.40 0.73 0.40
( A, D, C ) ( 2, 0, 0 ) 0.30 0.76 0.76
( A, D, D ) ( 1, 1, 0 ) 0.40 0.40 0.73
( A, D, E ) ( 2, 1, 0 ) 0.30 0.73 0.76
( A, E, A ) ( 1, 0, 1 ) 0.40 0.73 0.40
( A, E, B ) ( 1, 0, 2 ) 0.73 0.76 0.30
( A, E, C ) ( 2, 0, 1 ) 0.30 0.76 0.73
( A, E, D ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( A, E, E ) ( 2, 1, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( B, A, A ) ( 1, 0, 0 ) 0.40 0.73 0.73
( B, A, B ) ( 1, 0, 1 ) 0.40 0.73 0.40
( B, A, C ) ( 2, 0, 0 ) 0.30 0.76 0.76
( B, A, D ) ( 1, 1, 0 ) 0.40 0.40 0.73
( B, A, E ) ( 2, 1, 0 ) 0.30 0.73 0.76
( B, B, A ) ( 1, 1, 0 ) 0.40 0.40 0.73
( B, B, B ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( B, B, C ) ( 2, 1, 0 ) 0.30 0.73 0.76
( B, B, D ) ( 1, 2, 0 ) 0.73 0.30 0.76
( B, B, E ) ( 2, 2, 0 ) 0.30 0.30 0.76
( B, C, A ) ( 1, 0, 1 ) 0.40 0.73 0.40
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Table 5: Reward probabilities in the Extended Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
selection pattern degree of charges probability
( B, C, B ) ( 1, 0, 2 ) 0.73 0.76 0.30
( B, C, C ) ( 2, 0, 1 ) 0.30 0.76 0.73
( B, C, D ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( B, C, E ) ( 2, 1, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( B, D, A ) ( 2, 0, 0 ) 0.30 0.76 0.76
( B, D, B ) ( 2, 0, 1 ) 0.30 0.76 0.73
( B, D, C ) ( 3, 0, 0 ) 0.20 0.79 0.79
( B, D, D ) ( 2, 1, 0 ) 0.30 0.73 0.76
( B, D, E ) ( 3, 1, 0 ) 0.20 0.76 0.79
( B, E, A ) ( 2, 0, 1 ) 0.30 0.76 0.73
( B, E, B ) ( 2, 0, 2 ) 0.30 0.76 0.30
( B, E, C ) ( 3, 0, 1 ) 0.20 0.79 0.76
( B, E, D ) ( 2, 1, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( B, E, E ) ( 3, 1, 1 ) 0.30 0.76 0.76
( C, A, A ) ( 0, 1, 0 ) 0.73 0.40 0.73
( C, A, B ) ( 0, 1, 1 ) 0.73 0.40 0.40
( C, A, C ) ( 1, 1, 0 ) 0.40 0.40 0.73
( C, A, D ) ( 0, 2, 0 ) 0.76 0.30 0.76
( C, A, E ) ( 1, 2, 0 ) 0.73 0.30 0.76
( C, B, A ) ( 0, 2, 0 ) 0.76 0.30 0.76
( C, B, B ) ( 0, 2, 1 ) 0.76 0.30 0.73
( C, B, C ) ( 1, 2, 0 ) 0.73 0.30 0.76
( C, B, D ) ( 0, 3, 0 ) 0.79 0.20 0.79
( C, B, E ) ( 1, 3, 0 ) 0.76 0.20 0.79
( C, C, A ) ( 0, 1, 1 ) 0.73 0.40 0.40
( C, C, B ) ( 0, 1, 2 ) 0.76 0.73 0.30
( C, C, C ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( C, C, D ) ( 0, 2, 1 ) 0.76 0.30 0.73
( C, C, E ) ( 1, 2, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( C, D, A ) ( 1, 1, 0 ) 0.40 0.40 0.73
( C, D, B ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( C, D, C ) ( 2, 1, 0 ) 0.30 0.73 0.76
( C, D, D ) ( 1, 2, 0 ) 0.73 0.30 0.76
( C, D, E ) ( 2, 2, 0 ) 0.30 0.30 0.76
( C, E, A ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( C, E, B ) ( 1, 1, 2 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
28
Table 6: Reward probabilities in the Extended Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
selection pattern degree of charges probability
( C, E, C ) ( 2, 1, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( C, E, D ) ( 1, 2, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( C, E, E ) ( 2, 2, 1 ) 0.40 0.40 0.73
( D, A, A ) ( 0, 0, 1 ) 0.73 0.73 0.40
( D, A, B ) ( 0, 0, 2 ) 0.76 0.76 0.30
( D, A, C ) ( 1, 0, 1 ) 0.40 0.73 0.40
( D, A, D ) ( 0, 1, 1 ) 0.73 0.40 0.40
( D, A, E ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( D, B, A ) ( 0, 1, 1 ) 0.73 0.40 0.40
( D, B, B ) ( 0, 1, 2 ) 0.76 0.73 0.30
( D, B, C ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( D, B, D ) ( 0, 2, 1 ) 0.76 0.30 0.73
( D, B, E ) ( 1, 2, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( D, C, A ) ( 0, 0, 2 ) 0.76 0.76 0.30
( D, C, B ) ( 0, 0, 3 ) 0.79 0.79 0.20
( D, C, C ) ( 1, 0, 2 ) 0.73 0.76 0.30
( D, C, D ) ( 0, 1, 2 ) 0.76 0.73 0.30
( D, C, E ) ( 1, 1, 2 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( D, D, A ) ( 1, 0, 1 ) 0.40 0.73 0.40
( D, D, B ) ( 1, 0, 2 ) 0.73 0.76 0.30
( D, D, C ) ( 2, 0, 1 ) 0.30 0.76 0.73
( D, D, D ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( D, D, E ) ( 2, 1, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( D, E, A ) ( 1, 0, 2 ) 0.73 0.76 0.30
( D, E, B ) ( 1, 0, 3 ) 0.76 0.79 0.20
( D, E, C ) ( 2, 0, 2 ) 0.30 0.76 0.30
( D, E, D ) ( 1, 1, 2 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( D, E, E ) ( 2, 1, 2 ) 0.40 0.73 0.40
( E, A, A ) ( 0, 1, 1 ) 0.73 0.40 0.40
( E, A, B ) ( 0, 1, 2 ) 0.76 0.73 0.30
( E, A, C ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( E, A, D ) ( 0, 2, 1 ) 0.76 0.30 0.73
( E, A, E ) ( 1, 2, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( E, B, A ) ( 0, 2, 1 ) 0.76 0.30 0.73
( E, B, B ) ( 0, 2, 2 ) 0.76 0.30 0.30
( E, B, C ) ( 1, 2, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
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Table 7: Reward probabilities in the Extended Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
selection pattern degree of charges probability
( E, B, D ) ( 0, 3, 1 ) 0.79 0.20 0.76
( E, B, E ) ( 1, 3, 1 ) 0.76 0.30 0.76
( E, C, A ) ( 0, 1, 2 ) 0.76 0.73 0.30
( E, C, B ) ( 0, 1, 3 ) 0.79 0.76 0.20
( E, C, C ) ( 1, 1, 2 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( E, C, D ) ( 0, 2, 2 ) 0.76 0.30 0.30
( E, C, E ) ( 1, 2, 2 ) 0.73 0.40 0.40
( E, D, A ) ( 1, 1, 1 ) 0.60 0.60 0.60
( E, D, B ) ( 1, 1, 2 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( E, D, C ) ( 2, 1, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( E, D, D ) ( 1, 2, 1 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( E, D, E ) ( 2, 2, 1 ) 0.40 0.40 0.73
( E, E, A ) ( 1, 1, 2 ) 0.70 0.70 0.70
( E, E, B ) ( 1, 1, 3 ) 0.76 0.76 0.30
( E, E, C ) ( 2, 1, 2 ) 0.40 0.73 0.40
( E, E, D ) ( 1, 2, 2 ) 0.73 0.40 0.40
( E, E, E ) ( 2, 2, 2 ) 0.50 0.50 0.50
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